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A B S T R A C T
The United Nations human rights system has in recent years been divided on the question as to whether coercive
care interventions, including coercive psychiatric care, can ever be justiﬁed under UN human rights standards.
Some within the UN human rights community hold that coercive care can comply with human rights standards,
provided that the coercive intervention is a necessary and proportionate means to achieve certain approved
aims, and that appropriate legal safeguards are in place. Others have held that coercive care is never justiﬁed.
Disagreement over this issue has produced an impasse in the UN human rights system. We survey the impasse
with particular attention to the legal arguments that inform the divergent positions. In doing so we introduce a
distinction among a variety of diﬀerent ‘abolitionist’ positions regarding coercive care, and draw a distinction
between ‘non-consensual’ and ‘coercive’ treatment. We conclude with three proposals for moving beyond the
current impasse.
1. Introduction
All over the world, governments and legislatures are considering
whether and how to reform mental health and mental capacity legis-
lation in order to ensure greater respect for human rights. In evaluating
potential pathways for reform, it is natural to look to the UN human
rights system for guidance. How should states parties design a human-
rights-compliant framework for the provision and regulation of health
care, including mental health care? Alas, what we ﬁnd in the UN system
is a notable lack of agreement among diﬀerent treaty bodies and oﬃ-
cials, particularly on the question of whether coercive care can ever
comply with human rights standards. We refer to this situation as “the
Geneva Impasse,” since the conﬂicting positions have been developed,
articulated and adopted by UN Committees that meet in Geneva.1
Our aim in what follows is neither to settle this dispute nor to take
sides in it. We propose instead to study the impasse with the tools of a
surveyor, constructing a systematic mapping of the legal issues and
arguments that have produced it. The initial task in this mapping ex-
ercise is to identify and specify the issue that has occasioned the im-
passe. What exactly do the diﬀerent parties disagree about? In doing so
we introduce a distinction among a variety of diﬀerent “abolitionist”
positions regarding coercive care, and draw a distinction between “non-
consensual” and “coercive” treatment. We then go on to analyse the
underlying legal structure of the impasse. Legally, the disputing parties
share a common starting point: the rights enumerated in the several UN
human rights covenants and conventions. So what is the legal reasoning
that takes us from this common point of departure to conﬂicting con-
clusions? In addressing this question we clarify the notion of an “ab-
solute ban” and its correlate, the concept of an “absolute right.”
Before turning to the matter at hand, three preliminary remarks may
be in order. First, debates concerning coercive care sometimes operate
with the implicit assumption that the issue arises only in the context of
psychiatry. This is an assumption that we have taken care to avoid.
Although there are some UN positions that are narrowly concerned with
practices speciﬁc to psychiatric medicine, the positions that have pro-
duced the Geneva Impasse were for the most part carefully drafted so as
to apply to any medical intervention – psychiatric or otherwise. In order
to disrupt the entrenched assumption that the human rights issues in
this area are conﬁned to the context of mental illness, we shall make
strategic use of two examples. One example comes from the context of
psychiatric illness; the other has nothing to do with psychiatry.
Secondly, our analysis in what follows proceeds slowly, and we have
tried to be as explicit as possible in deﬁning key concepts and claims,
and in providing fully explicit statements of key arguments. In places
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we review in detail matters that some readers may consider elementary;
in other places we might be accused of belabouring the obvious. These
have seemed to us to be risks worth taking. The matters with which we
are concerned have occasioned considerable controversy; the impasse
we are analysing is considered by many to be intractable; the relevant
policy decisions could hardly be more important. We therefore seek the
indulgence of readers in working through the issues and arguments one
small step at a time.
Finally, our aim in this survey is not simply to document diﬀerences
and disagreements, but also to look for points of actual or potential
agreement. Our hope is that bringing the legal architecture of the im-
passe more fully into view might contribute towards the development
of a common UN human rights position on a question of fundamental
importance. We therefore conclude with three proposals for moving
beyond the current impasse.
2. Mapping the impasse
In earlier work, we have reported in detail on a variety of diﬀerent
positions that have been taken by UN bodies and UN oﬃcials on the
core question of coercive care interventions (Gurbai & Martin, 2018).
For present purposes, we take our initial bearings from two formal UN
documents adopted by two diﬀerent treaty bodies within the UN human
rights system.
The UN Human Rights Committee is the treaty body for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General
Assembly, 1966; hereafter: ICCPR). In 2014, the Human Rights Com-
mittee adopted General Comment 35 (UN Human Rights Committee,
2014; hereafter: GC35), which provides guidance to states parties on
compliance with ICCPR Art 9 (Liberty and Security of Person). This has
direct relevance to our topic, insofar as coercive care practices in-
trinsically involve a deprivation of liberty. The ﬁnal paragraph of GC35
bears directly on this issue:
The existence of a disability shall not in itself justify a deprivation of
liberty but rather any deprivation of liberty must be necessary and
proportionate, for the purpose of protecting the individual in
question from serious harm or preventing injury to others. It must be
applied only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appro-
priate period of time, and must be accompanied by adequate pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards established by law (GC35, para
19).
This is a framework that we ﬁnd reﬂected in existing legislation in
many jurisdictions around the world – legislation that authorises
coercive medical interventions when certain legal conditions are met
and appropriate safeguards are in place.2
We can contrast this position with a statement adopted by the UN
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is the
treaty body for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (UN General Assembly, 2006; hereafter: CRPD). In 2015,
the CRPD Committee adopted a set of Guidelines concerning CRPD Art
14 (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2015;
hereafter: G14), which also concerns liberty. G14 includes the following
passage:
The Committee has established that [CRPD] Article 14 does not
permit any exceptions whereby persons may be detained on the
grounds of their actual or perceived impairment. However, legisla-
tion of several States parties, including mental health laws, still
provide instances in which persons may be detained on the grounds
of their actual or perceived impairment, provided there are other
reasons for their detention, including that they are deemed dan-
gerous to themselves or others. This practice is incompatible with
[CRPD] Article 14; it is discriminatory in nature and amounts to
arbitrary deprivation of liberty (G14, para. 6).
Both of the quoted passages are addressed to the question of de-
tention rather than care or treatment per se. But they already allow us
to see the basic shape of the Geneva Impasse. The watershed question
might be posed as follows: Can coercive treatment ever comply with UN
human rights standards? The answer from one part of the UN human
rights system seems to be: “Yes, provided that certain conditions are
met.” But another part of the same system seems to be pointing towards
an exceptionless “No.”
This ‘watershed question’ is one on which it is diﬃcult to foresee
compromise. As posed, our question is a clear example of what gram-
marians call a “closed question.” That is, the only possible answers are
YES or NO. In considering one's answer, it is crucial to pause over the
word “ever.” If we think that there are any circumstances where coer-
cive care is justiﬁed, then our answer to the watershed question must be
YES; the challenge is then to articulate a legal standard that deﬁnes and
delimits those circumstances. To answer NO is to conclude that coercive
care is never justiﬁed. That makes the impasse look intractable, and can
make compromise between the two positions seem impossible.
3. Abolition: a buyer's guide
In trying to map the impasse more exactly, it will be worthwhile to
consider how one might operationalise the negative answer to the
watershed question. Following Wilson, 2018, we will refer to the ne-
gative answer as the “Abolitionist” position, since it calls for the abo-
lition of a whole array of status quo practices, institutions and statutes
that are involved in involuntary admission and coercive treatment.3 But
it is vital to recognise that Abolition can take a variety of diﬀerent
forms. We survey three initial options here, although we don't mean to
suggest that this list is exhaustive.
The most extreme example of abolition is what we shall call “A1
Abolition.” To adopt this approach would be to abolish all involuntary
admission and coercive care and adopt in its place the principle that:
(A1) No hospital admission or medical intervention shall be un-
dertaken without prior valid consent.
It is important to recognise that A1 Abolition is a very extreme
policy. Our ﬁrst example brings this into sharp relief. Suppose that you
are a paramedic, arriving at the scene of an accident involving a
wheelchair-user and a bus. A disabled accident victim is unconscious.
Given the circumstances, it is clearly not possible to obtain valid con-
sent for medical treatment. Under A1 Abolition you would have to re-
frain even from basic ﬁrst aid, much less admission to hospital.
If A1 Abolition seems too extreme, then we need to look for alter-
natives. Consider A2 Abolition:
(A2) No hospital admission or medical intervention shall be un-
dertaken in the face of valid refusal.
On its face, A2 Abolition might seem similar to A1 Abolition. But
notice that it makes all the diﬀerence to our paramedic. The un-
conscious accident victim can't consent, but neither is he refusing. So
A2 Abolition leaves room for a paramedic to do her job: stabilise,
transport, admit if appropriate.
In our view, A2 has obvious advantages over A1, but it is probably
not radical enough to satisfy the principal advocates of Abolition. That
is because of its reliance on the notion of valid refusal. At least under
2 Consider a representative example from the UK. Under the Mental Health
Act for England and Wales, disability alone can never warrant a deprivation of
liberty. But the presence of mental disorder in combination with other factors
(notably ‘danger to self or others’) can be used to warrant detention and/or
coercive care, provided that suitable legal procedures are followed and the
prescribed safeguards are in place. 3 For an inﬂuential statement of the case for abolition, see Minkowitz, 2010.
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current law, a refusal of treatment is valid only if undertaken by
someone with competence or “mental capacity.” A2 thus leaves open
the possibility of coercive treatment in cases where capacity is found to
be absent. It would therefore allow for the retention of locked wards,
which Abolitionists typically want to abolish. A third form of Abolition
removes this restriction:
(A3) No hospital admission or medical intervention shall be un-
dertaken in the face of any dissent, resistance or objection.
A3 diﬀers from A2 in setting aside any assessment of the validity of
dissent or refusal. If a patient objects to treatment then, under A3, their
resistance should never be overcome. Unlike A2, A3 could provide the
basis for the abolition of locked wards.4
We return below to consider whether there might be other viable
variants on the abolitionist position. But already we can use this initial
typology in order to reﬁne our survey of the Geneva Impasse. We cited
above the Guidelines from the CRPD Committee on CRPD Art 14. But it
is important now to consider those Guidelines in conjunction with a
passage from the same committee's General Comment 1 (UN Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014; hereafter: GC1). Al-
though GC1 is principally concerned with CRPD Art 12 (Equal Re-
cognition before the Law), it includes two paragraphs that concern
Articles 14 (Liberty and Security of the Person) and 25 (Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health). The Committee there states:
States parties have an obligation to require all health and medical
professionals (including psychiatric professionals) to obtain the free
and informed consent of persons with disabilities prior to any
treatment. In conjunction with the right to legal capacity on an
equal basis with others, States parties have an obligation not to
permit substitute decision-makers to provide consent on behalf of
persons with disabilities (para. 41).
Notice that the ﬁrst sentence in this passage (as drafted) is an un-
equivocal endorsement of A1 Abolition. That is, it calls for states parties
to disallow any medical treatment in the absence of free and informed
consent, which must itself be provided in advance of any treatment.
Notice also that the scope of the Committee's claim encompasses all
health and medical professionals; there is no restriction to the speciﬁc
context of psychiatric care. Applied to the circumstance of our un-
conscious disabled accident victim, it would mean that no treatment
could be provided by the paramedic. The second sentence in the pas-
sage eﬀectively doubles down on this position by cutting oﬀ a possible
workaround, blocking a route whereby someone else might consent on
the accident victim's behalf.
4. Non-consensual, coercive and involuntary treatment
Before going further, it will be worthwhile to pause brieﬂy over a
matter of terminology. Pūras has described the impasse as concerning
the question of non-consensual treatment (supra, fn 1). In various other
documents and analyses, one ﬁnds mention of “involuntary treatment,”
“coercive treatment,” or “forced treatment.” These terms are sometimes
used interchangeably, but we ﬁnd it useful to draw a distinction among
them.
At least as we shall use the term, non-consensual treatment is any
treatment that is undertaken in the absence of valid consent (Non-
Consensual=Without Consent.) But it is important to appreciate that
not all non-consensual treatment is coercive or forced. Suppose for
example that the paramedic in our example had proceeded to provide
emergency medical treatment to the unconscious accident victim –
contrary to the explicit requirements of GC1 as drafted and adopted.
That treatment would be non-consensual, since no valid consent was
obtained, but it does not seem right to describe it as coercive or forced.
After all, the accident victim is not resisting, and (at least in the absence
of contrary evidence) it is entirely reasonable for the paramedic to as-
sume that the victim would indeed have consented to necessary and
appropriate medical treatment had he been able to do so. So we need a
way of distinguishing between the broader class of non-consensual
treatment and the narrower subset of such treatment that is aptly de-
scribed as coercive. Both the broader class and the narrower subset
raise important human rights issues, but the issues are not always the
same.
There are a variety of ways in which such a distinction might be
drawn. For example, one might deﬁne care as coercive only when the
patient is actually objecting, and treatment is imposed over those ob-
jections. Alternatively, one could adopt a broader deﬁnition, which
would include not only actual objection but “counter-factual objec-
tion.” On this approach, care would count as coercive if the patient
either actually objects or would have objected had he been able to do
so.5 Our approach will be to deﬁne treatment as coercive (or forced)
insofar as it is contrary to the reasonably ascertainable will or pre-
ference of the patient. Actual objection, under this deﬁnition, would be
one form of evidence concerning the will and preference of the person,
but treatment might be contrary to someone's reasonably ascertainable
will or preference even though they are not objecting.
For the purposes of the present discussion, we have decided to avoid
the term “involuntary treatment.” We are not convinced that there is a
legally signiﬁcant third category beyond the two that we have already
deﬁned. Moreover, in our discussions with stakeholders, we have found
that “involuntary treatment” is used ambiguously – sometimes as
equivalent to “non-consensual” and sometimes as equivalent to “coer-
cive” (in the sense we have deﬁned it). Because of this ambiguity we
ﬁnd it safest to avoid the term altogether. However, given our deﬁnition
of “coercive” in terms of “contrary to the will,” and given the etymology
of the term “involuntary” (which comes from the Latin, voluntas – the
will), there is some reason to treat “involuntary treatment” as a sy-
nonym for “coercive treatment.” (Coercive/Involuntary=Contrary to
Will or Preference.)
With these distinctions in hand we can now give greater precision to
our mapping of the Geneva Impasse. The CRPD Committee has adopted
an A1 Abolitionist position — forbidding both non-consensual and
coercive treatment. The Human Rights Committee, by contrast, enu-
merates a set of conditions and safeguards under which not only non-
consensual but also coercive treatment might be permissible.
5. Explaining the impasse: two approaches
The next task is to try to understand how we arrived at this impasse.
What is the source of the schism?6 This is a question that we have posed
4 A variant of A3 Abolition is defended in Brosnan & Flynn, 2017. See in
particular page 66: “If there is any indication that the person is refusing
treatment, this must be respected.” It is worth noting that respect in this context
certainly would not preclude engaging in respectful and non-coercive persua-
sion and support.
5 In England and Wales, the 2008 edition of the Code of Practice for the
Mental Health Act adopted a counterfactual approach in deﬁning ‘objection.’
“[W]hether a patient is objecting has to be considered in the round, taking into
account all the circumstances, so far as they are reasonably ascertainable. … If
there is reason to think that a patient would object, if able to do so, then the
patient should be taken to be objecting.” Department of Health, 2008, para
4.19. The most recent revision to the Code of Practice has removed this coun-
terfactual test. Department of Health, 2015.
6 Open disagreement between treaty bodies within the UN human rights
system has been remarkably rare. The case we are concerned with here is one of
only a handful examples of which we are aware. The three other cases have
concerned: (1) the permissibility of abortion in cases of foetal impairment, (2)
the right to vote and to hold oﬃce, and (3) the permissibility of restrictions on
legal capacity through the imposition of guardianship regimes. Concerning (1),
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the
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in private conversations with a variety of stakeholders in the UN human
rights community. The explanations that have been oﬀered have for the
most part been broadly sociological in nature. That is, the source of the
disagreement is traced back to the social and professional positions of
the persons involved in formulating the divergent Comments and
Guidelines. Hence for example, we have been told that “the member-
ship of the two Committees diﬀers,” that “the CRPD Committee has
high representation from Persons with Disabilities,” or that “the CRPD
Committee lacks medical representation.” One former member of the
Human Rights Committee has written that “specialized treaty bodies
may lack legal expertise [or] pay insuﬃcient attention to the rights of
others that may come into conﬂict with the rights within their specia-
lized mandate” (Neuman, 2018, 42).7
These sociological explanations are interesting and important, but
we should not let them distract us from the underlying legal structure of
the impasse. Our primary concern here is to identify the diﬀerent paths
of legal reasoning whereby the two Committees warrant their re-
spective positions. In addition to the intrinsic importance of that legal
reasoning, there are three reasons to adopt this approach. Firstly, the
disputed question is ultimately a legal one: the issue is about what
policies are lawful under a set of agreed international legal norms.
Secondly, if we can get clear about the nub of the legal disagreement,
this might itself suggest ways of breaking through the impasse. But
there is also a third, and more troubling reason to adopt this approach.
If indeed there are sound legal arguments in support of two contra-
dictory positions on this policy question, this would indicate that the
enumerated rights of the several UN treaties and conventions them-
selves form a logically inconsistent set. That would be a signiﬁcant
ﬁnding in its own right.
So what is the legal reasoning that lies behind the two conﬂicting
conclusions? Alas, it is not entirely straightforward to ﬁnd out. One
lamentable feature of the relevant UN documents is that they are often
quite thin on explicit legal argumentation. The two committees adopt
statements of legal conclusions either without any argumentation at all,
or with arguments that are at best enthymematic. In the face of this
lacuna, we shall adopt an approach that we have used in other work
(See for example: Martin et al., 2016Martin, Michalowski, Jütten, &
Burch, 2014). In the next three sections, we survey three diﬀerent ways
of understanding the legal argumentation that has produced the im-
passe. In doing so we are seeking to provide an explicit articulation of
reasoning that is left largely implicit in the documents and positions
adopted by the two UN bodies. Our reconstructions are guided by two
closely connected desiderata: legal soundness and hermeneutic ﬁt. That
is, we are looking for the strongest possible legal arguments for the
conclusions reached by the two Committees, and we are looking for
reconstructions that help make sense of the various claims and state-
ments that they have adopted.
6. A proportionality interpretation
A ﬁrst way to understand the legal structure of the impasse would
be to trace it back to two diverging applications of a proportionality
exercise. Because UN human rights treaties and conventions enumerate
a multiplicity of human rights, circumstances arise where rights conﬂict
with one another. One familiar legal response to such circumstances is
to engage in a proportionality exercise: compromises on some rights
may be permitted if the policy adopted is a proportionate measure for
protecting one or more fundamental rights (see for example: Klatt &
Meister, 2012). Crucially, however, there is no algorithm for pro-
portionality tests, and fully informed parties may reasonably disagree
about cases.
In order to see how the proportionality framework might make
sense of the Geneva Impasse, it will be useful to introduce our second
example. Think about a person with bipolar disorder, entering an acute
manic state. She knows (and the family knows and the care team
knows) that her acute manias can lead to very severe harm to herself or
to others; they can even threaten loss of life. Moreover, her ability to
assess risks is profoundly impaired during her manic episodes. Yet she
insists that she is not unwell, denies that she is entering a manic epi-
sode, and does not consent to treatment.
In considering whether to resort to coercive treatment in such a
circumstance, we face a conﬂict of rights. How should we understand
the conﬂict in this example? As a start, we can say that the person in
question enjoys a right to life, and a right to the highest attainable
standard of health. There may be circumstances where eﬀective action
to protect those rights in the context of a manic episode can only rea-
listically be fulﬁlled through some kind of coercive intervention.
Moreover, there may be circumstances where the rights of other people
may be threatened unless a hospital admission or medical intervention
is imposed. On the other hand, the person also has a right to liberty, a
right to live in the community, a right to legal capacity on an equal
basis with others, a right to respect for her physical and mental in-
tegrity. Coercive intervention would compromise those rights and po-
tentially many others.
Our ﬁrst reconstruction understands the divergence between the
two UN positions as arising from divergent answers to this conundrum.
What is the appropriate response to this conﬂict among rights? The
Human Rights Committee holds that there are some circumstances
where a suitably circumscribed limitation of rights to liberty, life in the
community and legal capacity may be a proportionate response to a
threat to life, health, etc. The CRPD Committee comes to the opposite
conclusion: coercive care is a disproportionate measure for the pro-
tection of those rights. The debate becomes intractable insofar as there
is an intrinsically subjective component to legal judgements of pro-
portionality, and because the UN Human Rights system has no ﬁnal
authority to which appeal can be made in cases of divergent judge-
ments.8
(footnote continued)
Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights have called for access to abortion in case of foetal im-
pairment (UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
2013, para. 37(c); UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2011, para. 64(c);
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009a, para. 25). By
contrast, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has called for
the abolition of any distinction in the period allowed under law within which a
pregnancy can be terminated based solely on disability (UN Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2013a, paras. 14–15.). As regards (2), the
UN Human Rights Committee has held that “established mental incapacity may
be a ground for denying a person the right to vote or to hold oﬃce” (UN Human
Rights Committee, 1996, para 4). However, the CRPD Committee stated that “a
person's decision-making ability cannot be a justiﬁcation for any exclusion of
persons with disabilities from exercising their political rights, including the
right to vote, the right to stand for election and the right to serve as a member of
a jury” (GC1, para 48). Regarding (3), the Human Rights Committee's Con-
cluding Observations have seemed to recognise the permissibility of guar-
dianship arrangements (UN Human Rights Committee, 2009, para 19(a)),
whereas GC1 rejects them.
7 Neuman was a member of the Human Rights Committee at the time when
GC35 was drafted and adopted. In the same passage he goes on to write: “Of
course, the HRC may also have misperceived empirical realities that the other
treaty body understands better, or may have neglected the perspective of a
disadvantaged group whose situation prompted the creation of the other
treaty.”
8 The independence of the several human rights treaty bodies and their
members is a declared principle of the functioning of the UN human rights
system. See for example: UN General Assembly, 2014, paras 35–36, and UN
General Assembly, 2012, Annex I, paras 2–7. Concerning the non-hierarchical
structure of the UN treaty body system see for example, UN Secretariat, 2006,
para 23. “The treaty body system has developed ad hoc and it does not function
as an integrated and indivisible framework for human rights protection. […] A
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So how well does this ﬁrst analysis satisfy our two desiderata? As
regards the position of the Human Rights Committee, it does quite well.
It provides a prima facie plausible legal argument in support of the
position the Human Rights Committee has taken, and it also ﬁts with
the language used in articulating that position: notice in particular the
prominence of the term “proportional” in the passage we have quoted
from GC35. But the proportionality interpretation scores less well
against our desiderata when it comes to the position of the CRPD
Committee, and this for two reasons. First, we are not convinced that it
provides the strongest possible legal argument for Abolition. And
second, we are not convinced that it makes the best sense of the
Guidelines on Article 14 adopted by the CRPD Committee. These two
points will become clearer in the sections that follow, but the crucial
point is that the proportionality interpretation leaves a gap in the legal
argument for Abolition. This is because proportionality judgements are
by their nature particular, and are therefore sensitive to the particular
circumstances in any given case. In surveying the full range of cases,
one will eventually come to circumstances where (for example) the
imposition of a very small cost in liberty rights holds out the promise of
a huge gain on right-to-life or protection-against-abuse. A stronger ar-
gument for an Abolitionist position would need to provide some reason
to conclude, without giving consideration to the particulars of cases,
that no such circumstance could ever warrant a coercive care inter-
vention as a proportionate response to a threat to a fundamental right.
7. An absolute right interpretation
We turn now to a second construal of the legal divergence. The
starting point is the same: a conﬂict among rights such as the one that
arises in the circumstances of the manic episode. But the second in-
terpretation then centres on the principle that not all conﬂicts of rights
can be settled through a proportionality or “balancing” exercise. In
particular, where an absolute right is at stake, no proportionality rea-
soning gets started. Hence if coercive care is torture, or tantamount to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, for example, then it could
never comply with human rights standards. Notice that this provides a
diﬀerent way of understanding the underlying legal structure of the
Impasse. Our ﬁrst mapping of the Impasse understood the two UN
Committees as reaching divergent conclusions within the proportion-
ality framework; this alternate mapping treats the Impasse instead as a
dispute between the two Committees about whether the proportionality
framework is legally appropriate to the question at issue.
We have used the rights concerning torture in elaborating this
second legal schema, in part because it is the most familiar example of
an absolute right, and in part because there are a number of academics
and activists who have been making the argument that coercive psy-
chiatry is indeed either torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment (Minkowitz, 2007; Minkowitz, 2010; European Network of (Ex-)
Users and Survivors of Psychiatry et al., 2012, paras. 17 and 28).
Moreover, at least one judge in England has, in an obiter remark in a
Court of Protection ruling, ‘judged it likely’ that forced feeding in the
context of eating disorders can be tantamount to inhuman or degrading
treatment.9
A great advantage of this second interpretation is that it provides a
clearer path of legal reasoning in support of a strict Abolitionist position
– precisely what seemed to be lacking in the logic of the proportionality
interpretation. As in the case of slavery, an absolute right clearly
warrants an exceptionless ban. So how does the second interpretation
score against our desideratum of hermeneutic ﬁt? As we have seen, we
ﬁnd clear evidence that the position adopted in GC35 reﬂects the
conviction that a proportionality analysis is the appropriate legal fra-
mework for tackling these issues. So the hermeneutic ﬁt with the
statements from the Human Rights Committee is good. What about the
CRPD Committee? Here the picture is mixed. In G14, the CRPD
Committee enumerates speciﬁc practices (“seclusion and various
methods of restraint in medical facilities, including physical, chemical
and mechanic restrains [sic.]”) that it deems to be “not consistent with
the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment or punishment against persons with disabilities” (para. 12).
So it is clear that the CRPD Committee sees absolute rights as being
relevant to the legal assessment of coercive care practices. But notice
that this premise by itself could at most warrant an absolute ban on the
enumerated practices; once again we are left with a gap in the argument
for an absolute ban on coercion.
On this point, however, GC1 goes further. The CRPD Committee
there provides a catalogue of the rights that are violated by “forced
treatment by psychiatric and other medical professionals.” The cata-
logue includes “freedom from torture” (para. 42). If accepted, this claim
would complete the argument for an absolute ban on coercion, and
make a good ﬁt with this second interpretation of the dispute. If any
forced treatment is a violation of the right to be free from torture, then
all forced treatment (whether “by psychiatric or other medical profes-
sionals”) must be banned. But this premise also marks the principal
weakness of this second interpretation of the dispute. We can see this
with reference to our example of the manic episode. In order to use this
line of reasoning to warrant an absolute ban on coercive interventions
in such a circumstance, the CRPD Committee would need to accept not
only that certain enumerated practices, but that any coercive care in-
tervention (no matter its nature, purpose, severity, duration, condi-
tions, or manner of delivery) would be tantamount to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. This claim is ﬁercely disputed.10 A
stronger legal argument would be one that relied on a less contentious
premise.
8. An alternate absolute right interpretation
Our third interpretation echoes the second in locating the crux of
the Impasse in a dispute about absolute rights and the applicability of
judgments of proportionality. But instead of turning on the rights
concerning torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CRPD Art
15), the third interpretation turns on the question of whether there are
absolute rights at work in CRPD Articles 12 (Equality before the Law) or
14 (Liberty and Security of Person). On this interpretation of the dis-
pute, the Human Rights Committee is claiming that CRPD Art 12 and
Art 14 do not express absolute rights; they can therefore be limited or
restricted on the basis of a proportionality judgement. By contrast, the
CRPD Committee is claiming that coercive care contravenes Art 12 or
Art 14, that these articles express absolute rights, and that some form of
Abolition is therefore the only option.
This third interpretation of the case for Abolition has advantages
over the other two we have considered. Consider ﬁrst the matter of
legal soundness. Unlike the ﬁrst interpretation, this interpretation
avoids making the CRPD position rely on potentially irresolvable and
implausibly a priori proportionality judgements regarding the human-
(footnote continued)
lack of coordination and collaboration among the treaty bodies may result in
conﬂicting jurisprudence.”
9 A NHS foundation trust v. Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35: “repeated forcible
feeding over a long period of time against her clearly expressed wishes, most
especially with the use of physical restraint, is likely in my judgment to amount
to inhuman or degrading treatment” (para 46).
10 As one indicator of just how contentious this premise is, notice that the UN
Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture not only rejects it, but also holds
that there are circumstances where the withholding of non-consensual treat-
ment could itself amount to a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2016, para 15. See also
below, §11.3.
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rights-costs and human-rights-beneﬁts of coercive care. It thus avoids
the logical gap from which the ﬁrst interpretation suﬀered. It has an
advantage over the second argument because, in contrast to the rights
concerning freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, it is self-evident that all coercive care implicates the core
issues with which Articles 12 and 14 are concerned. After all, if care is
undertaken contrary to the reasonably ascertainable will of the care-
recipient, then it ipso facto constitutes a limit on the ability of the care-
recipient to exercise legal capacity in the matter of their own care ar-
rangements (Art 12); is also constitutes a very real limit to their liberty
(Art 14).
What about the matter of hermeneutic ﬁt? As with the ﬁrst two
interpretations of the dispute, the ﬁt with the statements from the
Human Rights Committee is good – for the same reasons that we have
reviewed above. On the side of the CRPD Committee, the ﬁt is tightest
in connection with the Art 14 variant of the argument. In the passage
from G14 that we cited at the outset, the key point to notice is the
Committee's claim “that [CRPD] Article 14 does not permit any ex-
ceptions” (para 6). That looks like an attempt to treat CRPD Art 14 as
expressive of an absolute right: no proportionality exercise should enter
into policy making, and no threat to other rights can ever suﬃce to
justify its curtailment. Notice furthermore that this claim comes in a
section of the Guidelines that carries the heading: “The absolute pro-
hibition on detention on the basis of disability” (emphasis added). Two
paragraphs later, the same document refers to an “absolute ban of de-
privation of liberty on the basis of impairment” (emphasis added). In a
later General Comment we ﬁnd a reference back to “the absolute pro-
hibition of detention on the basis of disability as enshrined in Article
14” (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2017,
para 27, emphasis added). This language ﬁts well with the third in-
terpretation of the dispute, particularly as other absolute bans in human
rights law (against slavery, against torture) are generally understood to
be rooted in absolute rights. So the treatment of CRPD Art 14 as ex-
pressive of an absolute right makes good sense of the Committee's
statements and the conceptual resources with which they are ex-
pressed.11
Of course the soundness of this line of legal argumentation must
ultimately depend on establishing that CRPD Art 14 does indeed ex-
press an absolute right. This may seem implausible. The principal focus
of Art 14 is the deprivation of liberty. It is universally agreed that that
there are some circumstances in which a deprivation of liberty can
accord with human rights standards. So it would be surprising, to say
the least, to elevate CRPD Art 14 to the status of an absolute right! But
on this point a crucial clariﬁcation is required. The foundational pre-
mise in this third interpretation of the CRPD Committee's argument for
Abolition is not that there is an absolute right not to be deprived of
one's liberty. The claim rather is that there is an absolute right not to be
deprived of one's liberty on the basis of a disability. Otherwise put, it is
only one speciﬁc clause of CRPD Art 14(1)(b) that is being treated as
expressing an absolute right: “[T]he existence of a disability shall in no
case justify a deprivation of liberty.”
9. Absolute rights in international law
In this section and the one that follows, we turn our attention di-
rectly to the concept of an absolute right. If our analysis so far is correct
then the best interpretation of the speciﬁcally legal structure of the
Geneva Impasse must focus as much on the status as on the content of
CRPD Art 14. For the Human Rights Committee, Art 14 is one right (or
one cluster of rights) among many. When Art 14 rights conﬂict with
other rights the appropriate response is a proportionality exercise,
which leaves open the possibility of a human-rights-compliant regime
of coercive care. For the CRPD Committee, Art 14 articulates an abso-
lute right that would rule out any proportionality justiﬁcation ab initio.
If indeed this is the best reconstruction of the dispute, then the Impasse
directly implicates the concept of an absolute right.
We note ﬁrst that the concept of an absolute right does not itself
ﬁgure in any of the UN human rights covenants or conventions – nor
indeed in other international human rights treaties. Since it is not used
there, it is also not deﬁned there. One might conclude on this basis that
the concept is best avoided in the interpretation and application of UN
human rights standards, and indeed some have argued that there are no
absolute rights.12 But UN treaty bodies do regularly use the concept. For
example, the UN Human Rights Committee denies that the right to life
is an absolute right (UN Human Rights Committee, 2018, para. 10),
while insisting that “the right to be tried by an independent and im-
partial tribunal is an absolute right that may suﬀer no exception.”13 The
concept is also regularly used by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), despite the absence of any explicit mention of absolute rights
in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).14
In the academic literature we ﬁnd a range of deﬁnitions of the term.
Shelton deﬁnes absolute rights by noting that “they apply without
limitations clauses and without possibility of reservation, derogation, or
denunciation, resulting in treaty-based ‘fundamental standards of
humanity’” (Shelton, 2005, 18). Gewirth writes that “a right is absolute
when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so that it can never
be justiﬁably infringed and it must be fulﬁlled without any exceptions”
(Gewirth, 1981, 2).
One thing to note about these deﬁnitions is that the concept of an
absolute right is more stringent than that of a non-derogable right.
Derogable rights are rights from which states are permitted to derogate,
subject to certain conditions and constraints, in times of “public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation” (ICCPR Art 4; see also
Art 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights). Non-derogable
rights are those which are not derogable in this sense; that is, they must
be respected, protected and fulﬁlled even in times of public emergency.
To describe a right as absolute is to go further: it is to say that no
limitations or restrictions on the right would ever be justiﬁed.15 So
while absolute rights are always non-derogable, non-derogable rights
can be either absolute (e.g. freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment) or non-absolute (e.g. right to
freedom of religion).16
11 We have not found analogous evidence to support the suggestion that the
CRPD Committee treats Art 12 as expressive of an absolute right. In this context
it is telling that while G14 uses the term “absolute” on three separate occasions,
GC1 uses the term only once (GC1, para. 34) and then only in connection with
the state's obligation to provide support for the exercise of legal capacity. For
this reason we will focus in what follows only on the Art 14 variant of this third
legal argument. However our analysis of the Art 14 variant applies, mutatis
mutandis, to an analogous argument anchored in the assertion of an absolute
Art 12 right.
12 See for example, Levinson, 1982; and Barak, 2012, 135.
13 Gonzalez del Rio v Peru (Views of 28 October 1992, Communication No.
263/1987, CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987), para 5.1.
14 The term “absolute right” has mainly been used by the ECtHR in connec-
tion with ECHR Art 3 (Prohibition of Torture), for example in Gäfgen v.
Germany at para 176, and in Saadi v. Italy at para 127. In some cases other
rights or certain elements of other rights are also claimed to be absolute. For
example in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (para. 334) the ECtHR
treats the right not to be sentenced to death as absolute element of ECHR Art 2
(Right to Life). In a number of cases the European Court of Human Rights uses
the term “absolute rights” in order to deny that a certain right is absolute, e.g. in
the cases of John Murray v. The United Kingdom at para 47.
15 According to the UN Human Rights Committee, 2001, para. 7: “Con-
ceptually, the qualiﬁcation of a Covenant provision as a non-derogable … does
not mean that no limitations or restrictions would ever be justiﬁed.”
16 ICCPR Art 4 explicitly includes ICCPR Art 18 among the non-derogable
rights. But ICCPR Art 18 itself, which concerns freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, expressly provides for the possibility of restrictions on those rights
when “necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others” (ICCPR Art 18.3). Freedom of
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For our purposes it is not necessary to settle on any one deﬁnition of
the term “absolute rights”; what matters are two key theorems that
govern the use of the concept and that are consistent with all the
published deﬁnitions:
T1. To every absolute ban there corresponds an absolute right (and vice
versa).
T2. Where a right is absolute there is neither need nor scope for
judgements of proportionality.
The point of T1 is that the concepts of an absolute ban (or absolute
prohibition) and the concept of an absolute right are strict correlates.
Hence for example if human beings have an absolute right not to be
enslaved then slavery is absolutely prohibited (and vice versa). The
point of T2 is that a right's status as absolute means that no pro-
portionality reasoning can ever warrant its infringement. Hence for
example we do not need to weigh up the potential human rights ben-
eﬁts of torturing a terrorism suspect in order to determine that doing so
is prohibited under human rights standards.
10. Which rights are absolute?
We have argued that the underlying legal structure of the Geneva
Impasse is best understood as a divergence between diﬀerent UN bodies
over which rights should be treated as absolute, i.e., as protected from
any restriction or limitation on the basis of a proportionality judge-
ment. As a ﬁnal step in our survey it is therefore natural to consider the
legal basis for a determination that an enumerated right in international
law is or is not absolute. Alas, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
agreed way of making such a determination. While there is a common
list of “usual suspects” that appear in lists of absolute rights (torture;
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; slavery; retrospective applica-
tion of the criminal law …), little is said about how these lists are
generated, or about how new candidates for a place on the honour roll
should be vetted.
This in itself may be somewhat surprising. As we have seen above,
UN treaty bodies regularly distinguish between absolute and non-ab-
solute rights. And the distinction makes a diﬀerence! To treat a right as
absolute is to grant it an exalted status in the hierarchy of rights; it is
also to mark very rigid boundaries within which states parties must
operate. So any system of human rights that relies on this concept
would seem to require some method of adjudicating disputes about
which rights merit this distinctive status.
Here again, alas, we ﬁnd the lamentable practice that we en-
countered above: the statement of legal conclusions without articula-
tion of the legal reasoning upon which those conclusions rely. A par-
ticularly telling example can be found in the case of Gonzalez del Rio v
Peru, a case heard before the UN Human Rights Committee. The pas-
sage (cited above, supra, fn 13) in which an absolute right is asserted
reads in full as follows: “The Committee recalls that the right to be tried
by an independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right that may
suﬀer no exception” (emphasis added). But alas nothing in the judge-
ment indicates from where this ﬁnding was ‘recalled,’ or on what basis
it had originally been established.
For the sake of completeness, we note that the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1969;
hereafter: VCLT) also says nothing about how to determine whether a
particular right is absolute. The closest we ﬁnd is a deﬁnition of a
“peremptory norm of international law” – also known as jus cogens. The
VCLT oﬀers the following deﬁnition:
For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modiﬁed only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character (Article 53).
This is of limited use for our purposes. The ﬁrst problem is that the
standard invokes non-derogable rights, rather than the absolute rights
that are contested at the Geneva Impasse. The second problem is that
the VCLT standard for identifying jus cogens rights in eﬀect requires
recognition by the international community of States as a whole. This is
not a standard that provides useful guidance in trying to resolve a
substantive dispute in which authoritative representatives of the in-
ternational community ﬁnd themselves in disagreement!
In the face of this lacuna, we again adopt the approach of con-
structing arguments on either side of the question, guided by our two
desiderata. In doing so, we can start by adopting a via negativa. For
while there is no agreed method for determining that a particular right
is absolute, there are clear ways of identifying rights that are not ab-
solute. This can be done by looking to the particulars of the language in
which rights are enunciated. In the UN human rights covenants and
conventions, the speciﬁcation of some rights includes explicit state-
ments regarding restrictions, limitations or exceptions. (For one ex-
ample, see supra, fn 16.) This clearly demonstrates that the underlying
rights are not absolute. Other articles make strategic use of the words
like “arbitrary,” which again signal that the underlying right is not
absolute.17
Having established these negative criteria, one could then go fur-
ther. Wherever we ﬁnd the absence of these limiting formulations, this
might be taken as prima facie evidence that the right in question is
indeed to be understood as absolute. Finally, one could supplement this
negative standard with a positive one. In this case one would be looking
for formulations that signal exceptionless universality. For example:
“No one shall be held in slavery. Slavery and the slave trade in all their
forms shall be prohibited” (ICCPR Art 8.1). The strongest case in sup-
port of the claim that a particular right is absolute would then rest on a
combination of (a) the absence of any of the usual signals of restrictions
or limitations, and (b) the use of positive signals of exceptionless status.
How would CRPD Art 14 fare when assessed against this standard?
The Article as a whole would clearly not pass this test, insofar as it
requires states parties to ensure that persons with disability are not
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. These are canonical
signals of a restricted or limited right. But recall that the strongest ar-
gument for the CRPD Committee's abolitionist position does not rest on
the claim that Art 14 as a whole expresses an absolute right. The claim
is rather that one clause within Art 14 articulates such a right. When we
look to that one clause (“[T]he existence of a disability shall in no case
justify a deprivation of liberty”) we ﬁnd that each of the two conditions
are met. Negatively, we ﬁnd no signal of the need to recognise limita-
tions or restrictions. Positively we ﬁnd a form of words (“in no case”)
that signals exceptionless universality.
What about the other side of the argument? What evidence might be
advanced in rebutting the assertion of absolute status? Some have ar-
gued that there are no absolute rights (supra, fn 12). As we have seen,
the UN covenants and conventions make no use of this terminology,
and provide no explicit standard for distinguishing absolute from non-
absolute rights. This is in striking contrast to the case of non-derogable
rights, where the concept does occur in treaties, along with an explicit
distinction between the rights that have and lack this status. This might
be taken as evidence that no rights are granted absolute status within
the UN human rights system. Whatever one thinks of the strength of this
argument, however, it clearly does not satisfy our desideratum
(footnote continued)
thought, conscience and religion are therefore non-derogable but non-absolute
under the ICCPR.
17 ICCPR Art 6.1, for example, states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life” (emphasis added). This formulation signals that the right to life is not
absolute.
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regarding hermeneutic ﬁt. For as we have seen, the Human Rights
Committee explicitly relies on the assertion of absolute rights in other
contexts (supra, fn 13).
An alternate rebuttal might accept that there are absolute rights,
and indeed accept the test for absoluteness as outlined above, yet deny
that any right in CRPD Art 14 meets that standard. The claim here
might be that the clause under discussion appears within an Article that
includes the canonical signals of limitation and restriction. A third al-
ternative would be to accept that there are absolute rights while de-
nying that any superﬁcial test (i.e., a test that claims to “read oﬀ” ab-
solute status from the decontextualized language of individual articles)
can suﬃce to establish an absolute right. A proponent of this third re-
buttal might go on to add that the closest explicit analogue to an ab-
solute right in international human rights treaties is the jus cogens
rights described in VCLT Art 53. This might be taken as grounds for
concluding that something approximating an international consensus is
the only way to validate a claim to absolute rights.
11. Three steps beyond the impasse
Having now completed our survey of the Impasse, it is time to
consider what lessons it might teach us in looking for a way forward. It
would of course be naive to hope that the legal analysis provided here
could itself resolve what has become an entrenched and politically
sensitive dispute both within the UN human rights system and more
broadly in civil society. At most we have provided a guide to the un-
derlying legal architecture of the controversy. But such a guide might
prove useful in focusing discussion and debate on key areas where
further analysis is required. We also believe it can help identify three
signiﬁcant points on which constructive dialogue might be expected to
generate broad consensus. We certainly don't mean to suggest that these
three steps could suﬃce to resolve all the diﬀerences, but we see the
potential for them to form an agreed basis for continuing work towards
a consensus UN position.
11.1. Step one: rule out A1 abolition
In looking to move beyond the current impasse, one signiﬁcant
obstacle concerns the position that we have described as A1 Abolition.
As noted, this is a particularly extreme variant of the Abolitionist po-
sition, and would preclude the provision of even basic ﬁrst aid to any
person unable to give consent. In addition to the serious human rights
violations that could be occasioned by such an approach, our own view
is that it would be unethical to adopt such a policy. We also ﬁnd it
impossible to imagine the emergence of a democratic consensus sup-
porting it. It is therefore encouraging to recognise that A1 Abolition is
not actually entailed by any of the three legal arguments that we have
reconstructed.
To see this, consider how each of the three legal arguments would
bear upon our initial example of the paramedic and the unconscious
disabled accident victim. As we have seen, A1 Abolition would prohibit
any medical treatment in the absence of free and informed consent. But
what would be the legal basis for such a prohibition? The provision of
ﬁrst aid to an unconscious accident victim cannot plausibly be de-
scribed as a disproportionate response to the circumstance, which (inter
alia) presents a real threat to the person's right to life and to the highest
attainable standard of health. So the ﬁrst argument does not justify a
ban on a standard paramedic response. What about the second argu-
ment? In order to be applicable to this circumstance, we would have to
claim that the paramedic's intervention amounts either to torture, or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. But this is surely absurd. In
fact, we submit, the paramedic's actions are an exemplar of humane
treatment! What about the third argument, predicated on an absolute
right not to be deprived of one's liberty on the basis of a disability? It
also lacks application here, provided that the policies and practices of
the paramedic services are applicable to all on an equal basis. So A1
Abolition simply cannot be warranted (much less mandated) on the
basis of any of the arguments that we have reconstructed.
A1 Abolition is a position that continues to be espoused, whether
explicitly or by implication, within the UN human rights system.18 But
in light of what we have learned (both about its practical implications
for standard emergency services and about the lack of any identiﬁable
legal justiﬁcation) it is worth considering the possibility that A1 Abo-
lition is best understood as an inopportune statement of the CRPD
Committee's intended position. In support of this admittedly bold sug-
gestion we would add: (a) that the sentence advocating A1 Abolition
was not included in the draft of GC1 that was originally made available
to stakeholders for comment19; (b) that the ﬁnal version of GC1 in-
cluded a passage which seems to allow for medical interventions in
certain cases where “it is not practicable to determine the will and
preferences of an individual”20 – a policy which is prima facie incon-
sistent with A1 Abolition, which would disallow any intervention in the
absence of prior valid consent; (c) that in its many Concluding Ob-
servations, the CRPD Committee has never called upon states parties to
abolish standard emergency services that provide treatment to un-
conscious accident victims; and (d) that the CRPD Committee has al-
ready seen the need to correct an error that was introduced in the
process of editing GC1.21 Perhaps the most hermeneutically charitable
interpretation of all this evidence is that paragraph 41 of GC1 re-
presents a drafting error, and that the CRPD Committee never intended
to adopt A1 Abolition at all, nor to call upon states parties to adopt such
an extreme policy.
In considering the merits of this suggestion, it is helpful to return to
the distinction that we have proposed between non-consensual and
coercive treatment (§4, above). As we have seen, the ﬁnal language of
GC1 calls for a ban on non-consensual treatment – i.e., on any treatment
in the absence of prior free and informed consent. But elsewhere in GC1
we ﬁnd traces of a narrower ban that would allow treatment in the
18 In May, 2018, the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
hosted a consultation on the theme: Human Rights and Mental Health. The
recommendations that emerged from the consultation included the following:
“States should ensure that all health care and services, including all mental
health care and services, are based on the free and informed consent of the
individuals concerned” (emphasis added). (UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 2018, para. 46.) A year earlier, a report on the same topic from the High
Commissioner recommended “an end to involuntary treatment.” In elaborating
this recommendation, the report deﬁned valid consent and involuntary treat-
ment as follows: “In order for consent to be valid, it should be given voluntarily
and on the basis of complete information on the nature, consequences, beneﬁts
and risks of the treatment, on any harm associated with it and on the avail-
ability of alternatives. Involuntary treatment refers to the administration of
medical or therapeutic procedures without the consent of the individual.” The
report goes on to state that CRPD Article 14 “precludes non-consensual com-
mitment and treatment” (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017,
paras. 17 and 29). Both reports therefore entail a commitment to A1 Abolition.
19 The history on this point is rather complicated. A draft of GC1 was adopted
by the CRPD Committee at its tenth session (September 2–13, 2013), and an
“Advance Unedited Version” was widely circulated for public comment. This
version of the draft (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
2013b) seems no longer to be available on the UN website, but is available for
download on the Essex Autonomy Project website (https://autonomy.essex.ac.
uk/dgcart12auv). Notably, the words “prior to any treatment” do not appear in
this draft. (See in particular, para. 37.) In the absence of these four words, the
Draft General Comment did not include an unequivocal endorsement of A1
Abolition. A later version of the Draft General Comment was distributed on 25
November, 2013, and was included in the papers for the eleventh session of the
CRPD Committee (30 March–11 April, 2014). This second version of the draft,
which is available on the UN website (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, 2013c), includes the words “prior to any treatment.” GC1 was
formally adopted in April, 2014, although editing continued for some time
thereafter.
20 GC1, para 21.
21 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2018.
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absence of advance free and informed consent, provided that the
treatment provided accords with the “best interpretation of will and
preferences.”22 In the adopted version of GC1 there is an unresolved
tension between these two policies. Indeed we would go further and
argue that the two policies are inconsistent, as can be seen by con-
sidering what options each allows for the paramedic in our example. It
is therefore worth considering whether the drafters of GC1 erred in
those passages where they focused on non-consensual treatment when
it was in fact only coercive treatment which they sought to disallow.
We therefore propose that a useful ﬁrst step in advancing beyond
the current impasse would be to initiate discussions that bring together
both Abolitionists and representatives from the community of emer-
gency ﬁrst responders. Together, they might work through a range of
real-world scenarios in order to consider what A1 Abolition would
mean in practice for frontline emergency services. Support from human
rights lawyers and activists would ensure that such a dialogue was in-
formed by a complete survey of all possible arguments that might
conceivably provide a legal basis for a policy of A1 Abolition. We an-
ticipate that participants in such discussions will disagree about many
matters of law and policy. But it is reasonable to expect that the dis-
cussion would generate a broad consensus that A1 Abolition is not the
right solution to the policy challenges in this area, and is not required of
states parties in order to achieve compliance with the CRPD.
11.2. Step two: focus on discrimination
If we could ﬁnd a way past the obstacles associated with A1
Abolition, a second step beyond the impasse would be to identify po-
tential alternatives. Here again our legal analysis provides a useful lead.
What that analysis demonstrates is that the strongest Abolitionist ar-
gument with the best hermeneutic ﬁt relies on a principle of non-dis-
crimination in the deprivation of liberty. Notice, however, that none of
the three Abolitionist positions that we distinguished at the outset re-
ﬂect this core concern with non-discrimination. It therefore makes
sense to introduce a fourth form of Abolition that reﬂects a tighter link
between the proposed policy and the legal argument upon which it is
predicated:
(A4) No hospital admission or medical intervention shall be un-
dertaken on the basis of a policy that discriminates on the basis of a
disability.
It is worth considering whether some variant of A4 Abolition might
provide the basis for a consensus in moving beyond the current im-
passe.
In doing so, we can start by applying A4 Abolition to the circum-
stances faced by our paramedic. Let's assume that the paramedic treats
the disabled person at the scene and then facilitates admission to hos-
pital – all without obtaining free and informed consent. Would her
actions be permissible under A4 Abolition? Notice that in order to an-
swer this question we need to know more than simply the facts of the
particular case. (Does the accident victim have a disability? Was he able
to give consent? Did he resist or object? What medical treatment did he
require? Did he have any kind of advance directive?) All that in-
formation may be relevant, to be sure, but to determine the compat-
ibility with A4 Abolition we also need to know about the broader po-
licies and procedures under which the paramedic is operating. In
particular, we need to know whether the “rules of engagement” (so to
speak) for this particular paramedic service do indeed avoid disability-
based discrimination. In this particular example, the answer is plausibly
“yes.” The paramedic is providing non-consensual treatment to an un-
conscious disabled accident victim. But she is doing so because he is an
unconscious accident victim. The fact of the victim's disability is not a
determinant of her decision to act without free and informed consent,
and she would have done the same if (for example) she had been un-
informed about his disability, or if he had not had a disability at all.
In our view it is a great advantage of A4 Abolition that it both leaves
room in principle for the paramedic's non-consensual intervention, and
also directs our attention to these questions about the underlying po-
licies and procedures upon which intervention is predicated. A further
advantage of A4 Abolition concerns the matter of hermeneutic ﬁt.
Recall that G14 emphatically rules out deprivation of liberty on the
basis of disability alone, as well as deprivation of liberty on the basis of
disability plus other factors. But this leaves open a third alternative: a
policy based on other factors alone. So G14 seems to leave open, per-
haps even to point towards, some variant of an A4 policy.
As a second concrete step in working through the Impasse, there-
fore, we see the need for a collaborative exploration of what it would
mean to articulate A4 Abolition in the form of concrete policy. If indeed
A1 Abolition is considered untenable and unwarranted, the challenge
would be to frame candidate policies that meet two conditions: (a) they
permit non-consensual treatment (i.e., treatment in the absence of prior
free and informed consent) under at least some conditions, and (b) they
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
Work on this policy challenge would need to be informed by re-
search on a technical question of human rights law. Within the UN
human rights system there had been a broad and longstanding con-
sensus in support of what Wouter Vandenhole has described as “the
widely-used pragmatic deﬁnition of discrimination.”23 Under the
pragmatic deﬁnition, diﬀerential treatment does not amount to dis-
crimination, provided that the diﬀerential treatment can be justiﬁed on
a reasonable and objective ground. This principle can be found enun-
ciated, inter alia, in: Human Rights Committee, GC1824; UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GC2025; Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XIV.26
It is noteworthy that these several treaty bodies do not restrict this
approach to the context of indirect discrimination. Even diﬀerential
treatment that is expressly based on a protected characteristic can in
principle be justiﬁed. If it is justiﬁed then, under the pragmatic deﬁ-
nition, it is not discrimination.
In considering how A4 Abolition might be realised in policy, we see
the need for a dialogue within the UN human rights community as to
22 GC1, para 21; see also A/HRC/34/32, para 28.
23 Vandenhole, 2005, 71.
24 “Finally, the Committee observes that not every diﬀerentiation of treat-
ment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such diﬀerentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is le-
gitimate under the Covenant.” UN Human Rights Committee, 1989, para 13.
25 “Diﬀerential treatment based on prohibited grounds will be viewed as
discriminatory unless the justiﬁcation for diﬀerentiation is reasonable and ob-
jective. This will include an assessment as to whether the aim and eﬀects of the
measures or omissions are legitimate, compatible with the nature of the
Covenant rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a
democratic society. In addition, there must be a clear and reasonable re-
lationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realized and the
measures or omissions and their eﬀects. A failure to remove diﬀerential treat-
ment on the basis of a lack of available resources is not an objective and rea-
sonable justiﬁcation unless every eﬀort has been made to use all resources that
are at the State party's disposition in an eﬀort to address and eliminate the
discrimination, as a matter of priority.” UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 2009b, para 13.
26 “[A] diﬀerentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination if the
criteria for such diﬀerentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of
the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4,
of the Convention. In considering the criteria that may have been employed, the
Committee will acknowledge that particular actions may have varied purposes.
In seeking to determine whether an action has an eﬀect contrary to the
Convention, it will look to see whether that action has an unjustiﬁable disparate
impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin.” UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
1993, para 2. (Emphasis added)
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whether (and to what extent) this pragmatic deﬁnition remains valid. It
is noteworthy that the UN sources that explicitly endorse the pragmatic
approach all predate the adoption of the CRPD in 2006. So does the
CRPD leave the pragmatic deﬁnition intact or does it entail some kind
of qualiﬁcation or restriction? This is one of those seemingly fussy legal
technicalities upon which quite a lot turns in practice. A4 Abolition
calls for an end to all coercive and non-consensual care policies that
discriminate on the basis of disability. We see this as a strong candidate
for a further point of consensus in ﬁnding a way beyond the present
impasse. But there are potentially two quite diﬀerent routes that states
parties might take in trying to satisfy this condition. One strategy would
be to formulate so-called ‘disability-neutral’ policies – policies that
draw no distinctions on the basis of disability and apply to all on an
equal basis.27 In our example of the manic episode, coercive or non-
consensual care interventions would be permitted only if the policies
upon which they are predicated apply to all on an equal basis. But if the
pragmatic deﬁnition remains valid, then a policy need not be disability-
neutral in order to avoid disability-based discrimination.28 This would
leave open the possibility that states parties might continue to draw
distinctions on the basis of disability while adhering to A4 Abolition,
provided that the diﬀerential treatment was justiﬁed on a reasonable
and objective ground. In the circumstances of the manic episode, this
would leave room in principle for coercive or non-consensual inter-
ventions that are predicated upon the person's particular medical con-
dition. In order to give shape and direction to A4 Abolition, there is
therefore a need to revisit the pragmatic deﬁnition of discrimination in
light of the provisions of the CRPD. Does it still apply where diﬀerential
treatment is based on disability? Is it applicable where the diﬀerential
treatment involves deprivation of liberty? Ideally, such a reassessment
should involve representatives from the various UN treaty bodies which
have endorsed the pragmatic deﬁnition in the past.29
11.3. Step three: towards a general comment on CRPD art 15
These ﬁrst two steps beyond the impasse do not yet engage the
issues concerning torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment –
i.e., the CRPD Art. 15 rights. This is an area where the impasse may
prove the most intractable, and where strongly held opinions may be
most sharply divided; some have suggested to us that there is simply no
prospect for reaching a consensus. Before resorting to this despairing
conclusion, however, we see both a need and an opportunity to work
through the speciﬁcally legal arguments more fully.
One important lesson from our legal survey takes the form of a
distinction. As we have seen, some discussions of these issues take an
enumerative approach – listing speciﬁc practices of psychiatric care
that amount to violations of CRPD Art 15 when imposed without con-
sent. Other analyses adopt what we might call a blanket approach,
claiming that any forced treatment is ipso facto an Art 15 violation.
These two approaches are logically and legally distinct. As we have
noted, only the second approach would suﬃce to underwrite an abso-
lute ban on all coercive care. The enumerative approach could at most
warrant a ban on the enumerated practices, perhaps along with other
practices that are relevantly similar.30
The most explicit statement of the blanket claim appears in GC1,
para 42. We reported on this passage above, but it is perhaps now worth
quoting it in full.
As has been stated by the Committee in several concluding ob-
servations, forced treatment by psychiatric and other health and
medical professionals is a violation of the right to equal recognition
before the law and an infringement of the rights to personal integrity
(art. 17); freedom from torture (art. 15); and freedom from violence,
exploitation and abuse (art. 16).
It is important to notice that this claim exhibits two forms of gen-
erality. Note ﬁrst that the claim is wholly lacking in any qualiﬁcation or
restriction. The claim is not that certain particular clinical practices
violate CRPD Art 15, nor that forced psychiatric treatment is a violation
of CRPD Art 15, nor that forced treatment is an Art 15 violation when
imposed on a discriminatory basis. The claim is that any forced treat-
ment is a violation of CRPD Art 15. The claim is also general in a second
sense. It refers to “freedom from torture” and it cites CRPD Art 15, but it
does not draw any distinction among the four rights that are articulated
in CRPD Art 15: the right not to be tortured, the right not to be sub-
jected to cruel treatment; the right not to be subjected to inhuman
treatment; the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment. It
therefore might be read as claiming that any forced treatment is tan-
tamount to torture, or it might be read as claiming that any forced
treatment is a violation of at least one of the four Art 15 rights – without
specifying which one.
As a third step beyond the impasse, we see the need to achieve
greater clarity about this diﬃcult and contested issue by making use of
the discipline of explicit legal argumentation. If the enumerative ap-
proach is taken, then the challenge is to be explicit about the rationale
that informs the list of prohibited practices. This need not require the
articulation of some rigid criterion or decision-procedure; that may well
be unavailable in this case. But the work of making the rationale more
explicit would help avoid the appearance of arbitrariness; seeking a
reﬂective equilibrium between general principles and particular prac-
tices would facilitate extension of the enumerative approach to new
cases. If a blanket approach is taken, then the aim should be to provide
a full statement of the legal argument that warrants the blanket claim.
Work towards these goals can be greatly aided by drawing on other
UN sources. CRPD Art. 15 does not include any deﬁnition of torture;
neither does ICCPR Art 7. But a deﬁnition is provided in Article 1 of the
UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).31 A number of UN reports have
27 For three attempts to formulate disability-neutral policies that permit non-
consensual interventions at least in some cases, see Gooding & Flynn, 2015,
Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2017, and Brosnan & Flynn, 2017. Gooding and Flynn
propose the so-called ‘doctrine of necessity’ as a disability-neutral basis for
interventions; Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake propose the criteria of ‘imminent and
grave harm.’ Brosnan and Flynn would permit non-consensual interventions
only in those life-threatening situations where communication cannot be es-
tablished with the person, e.g. in the case of an unconscious person where
paramedics' intervention is needed. However, they propose that in certain
cases, including psychiatric treatment, non-consensual interventions should not
be allowed at all. For a critical assessment of the doctrine of necessity as a
disability-neutral approach, see Steele, 2017. For an analysis of Flynn & Arstein-
Kerslake, 2017 and Brosnan & Flynn, 2017, see Minkowitz, 2017.
28 The general point can be illustrated with a stock example: a state might
refuse to issue a driving licence to a blind person, or to someone subject to
regular epileptic seizures, precisely on the basis of their blindness or epilepsy.
This would not be a ‘disability-neutral’ policy, insofar as it singles out persons
for diﬀerential treatment precisely on the basis of their disability, but it might
nonetheless be a justiﬁable form of diﬀerential treatment. Under the long-
standing principle, it would then not amount to discrimination. We are grateful
to Lana Kerzner and Robert Dinerstein for suggesting these examples.
29 To date, the CRPD Committee has not adopted a formal position one way or
another on the continued validity of the “pragmatic deﬁnition” of discrimina-
tion, nor on the general legal principle that follows from it. An early draft of its
recent General Comment relied on a version of the pragmatic deﬁnition in the
context of an analysis of indirect discrimination. https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GCArt5.docx. See para 20 (b). The version of
the General Comment that was ﬁnally adopted did not include that passage, but
neither did it expressly reject the pragmatic deﬁnition or its correlate principle.
It is unclear whether this means that the Committee rejects the principle or
whether it has so far failed to reach an internal consensus as to its validity in
light of the CRPD.
30 For examples of the enumerative approach, see G14, para. 12, and
Kooijams, 1986, para 119.
31 “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act by
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undertaken analysis of that deﬁnition and struggled with the challenge
of applying it to cases.32 A particularly comprehensive analysis has
been provided by the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture.33 The
Human Rights Committee has on several occasions provided guidance
on ICCPR Art 7, both in its General Comments 7 and 20 and in its
rulings on speciﬁc complaints.34 A fully explicit legal argument on these
issues would presumptively begin from CAT Art 1, engage with existing
UN sources, and then undertake to demonstrate both that and why ei-
ther some or all forms of coercive care do indeed fall under one or
another of the categories of action that are banned under CRPD Art 15.
This could form part of the preparatory work for an eventual General
Comment on CRPD Art 15.
This is not the place to embark on that ﬁne-grained analysis, but one
ﬁnal observation is perhaps worth adding. The deﬁnition in CAT Art 1
directs attention to four elements that must be taken into account in
determining whether a particular act is tantamount to torture. The four
elements are: (i) the nature of the act; (ii) the intention of the perpe-
trator; (iii) the purpose; and (iv) the involvement of public oﬃcials
(supra, fn 31). The Human Rights Committee has provided a similar list,
distinguishing (i) the nature, (ii) the purpose and (iii) the severity of the
treatment applied (UN Human Rights Committee, 1992, para 4). These
schemata provide a legal and logical structure for investigating and
adjudicating allegations of violations of CRPD Art 15. Reliance on that
structure may or may not lead to a consensus on the disputed question,
but at the very least it could provide an agreed basis for gaining greater
clarity where diﬀerences remain.
12. Conclusion
As we noted at the outset, it was Dainius Pūras who described the
current situation in Geneva as an impasse. Pūras's, 2017 report con-
cluded with the following call:
The Special Rapporteur seeks to develop, through an inclusive and
participatory process and open dialogue, guidelines on human rights
and mental health to support all stakeholders in the implementation
of rights-based mental health policies in their respective areas of
work. He welcomes contributions and suggestions in this respect.
(supra, fn 1, para 90).
One of our aims in the foregoing survey has been to provide a set of
analytical tools that might prove useful in the ongoing dialogue for
which Pūras has called. We have proposed a distinction between non-
consensual and coercive care. We have distinguished four distinct
variants of the Abolitionist position. We have provided three re-
constructions of the legal arguments upon which the divergent posi-
tions rely, and in so doing we clariﬁed the concept of an absolute right
and distinguished enumerative from blanket approaches in the appli-
cation of CRPD Art 15. We have undertaken to disrupt the common
misapprehension that the issues at stake at the Impasse pertain
narrowly to coercive psychiatry. And we have outlined three concrete
steps where we believe there is a real prospect for generating a broad
consensus moving forward.
Our hope is that these contributions will be useful to those within
the UN human rights system who are seeking a way out of the current
stalemate. But our ﬁndings also have relevance beyond the ongoing
discussions and debates in Geneva. The fundamental issues which have
occasioned the Impasse are by no means exclusive to the UN context.
They arise in debates in legislatures, government agencies and civil
society organisations all over the world, as part of the ongoing,
worldwide eﬀort to develop new care practices that are fully respectful
of human rights. In this eﬀort, States parties are not in the end bound by
the ﬁndings of UN treaty bodies. But they are bound by the human
rights conventions to which they are party, and we share the view of
those who hold that States parties have an obligation to engage ser-
iously with the ﬁndings of treaty bodies with which they may dis-
agree.35 Our survey of the Geneva Impasse is oﬀered in support of those
around the world who are struggling to fulﬁl that obligation.
Our contributions here are not meant to exhaust the space of pos-
sibilities. We are open to the possibility that there may be legal argu-
ments that we have overlooked. And we recognise that there are further
possible Abolitionist policies beyond those that we have surveyed here.
We are under no illusions about the depths of continuing disagreement
in this area of human rights law and practice. But we also see important
opportunities for breaking through the current impasse by identifying
signiﬁcant points of agreement, gaining greater clarity about the legal
issues and arguments, and embarking on speciﬁc steps which might
reasonably be expected to resolve some existing disagreement and
provide an agreed pathway for working on those that remain.
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